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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NOONAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Christine DiIenno, the plaintiff in this suit for unlawful 
retaliation, was hired in November 1992 by Goodwill 
Industries of Mid-Eastern Pennsylvania (Goodwill) for its 
Trexlertown store. The formal job description was tagger- 
processor but in the Trexlertown store the processor sorted 
out the bags in which the donated clothes were dumped; 
taggers identified the brands and priced the clothes. 
DiIenno worked as a tagger. In November 1994, two years 
after she had started, she was promoted to acting shift 
supervisor; one perk of the job was possession of the keys 
to the store, enabling her to start her work early, a privilege 
she relished. 
 
In late November Drew Hosely was made manager of the 
store. Soon after his appointment Hosely began asking 
DiIenno personal questions, including questions about the 
state of her marriage. She told him the questions were none 
of his business. On December 5, 1994, over her objection, 
he required her to pick him up when he dropped off his car 
for repairs. On December 16, in the store office, he declared 
his love for her. She asked him to leave. He threw things on 
the desk and told her she would be demoted to doing 
processing. He then left. In tears she reported the incident 
to Jane Blanchard, secretary at the Shillington plant, who 
regularly called in for the store's daily figures. Blanchard 
had previously told her that she had been harassed by 
Hosely. 
 
On December 22, 1994 DiIenno met with Sandra 
O'Flaherty, Goodwill's sales manager, and Susan Gabriel, 
Goodwill's human resource director. O'Flaherty reacted 
with anger to DiIenno's charge against Hosely. She 
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informed DiIenno that she was being non-supportive of 
management (a ground for dismissal) and that she would 
have to process clothing. DiIenno's keys were taken from 
her. She was forbidden to speak on the phone to 
Blanchard, and her calls to Blanchard were now routed to 
others. Hosely himself was removed from his position at the 
store, and O'Flaherty took over the responsibilities of 
manager. 
 
At the December 22, meeting DiIenno had explained to 
O'Flaherty that she was "phobic of critters -- dead or alive 
that we found in donation bags -- mice, insects, bugs." She 
therefore could not and would not work as a processor; she 
had been hired as a tagger. On January 25, 1995 DiIenno 
received a memo from management directing her to 
produce a medical excuse or to begin processing clothes. 
On February 1, 1995, her treating physician provided a 
letter documenting her phobia. On February 6, she was 
directed by her immediate supervisor, Steve Brauner, to go 
through the bags. She attempted to comply, broke down, 
trembling and crying, and left. She then took medical leave. 
She was informed that when she returned she would have 
to do processing. 
 
The foregoing are the facts presented by the plaintiff in 
support of her claim that Goodwill violated 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-3(a) and in support of her appeal from summary 
judgment in favor of Goodwill. In summarizing these facts 
we do not determine their truth. We do conclude that, if 
true, they state a cause of action for retaliation. DiIenno did 
engage in activity protected by Title VII in protesting to 
management what she perceived as sexual harassment. 
She alleges that Goodwill took adverse employment action 
against her by assigning her to work Goodwill knew she 
could not perform. An apparent causal connection existed 
between her protest and Goodwill's response. All elements 
of the federal statutory tort were present. Nelson v. Upsala 
College, 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
To be clear, we hold that a transfer to a job that an 
employer knows an employee cannot do may constitute 
adverse employment action. We base our holding on the 
principle that what constitutes retaliation depends on what 
a person in the plaintiff's position would reasonably 
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understand. It is important to take a plaintiff's job-related 
attributes into account when determining whether a lateral 
transfer was an adverse employment action. An inability to 
do a particular job is job-related, unlike a desire to live in 
a certain city. See Serrano-Cruz v. DFI Puerto Rico, Inc., 109 
F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (setting an employee up to fail 
can be adverse action); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 325 
(2d Cir. 1996) (reassignment to a job requiring afive-story 
climb could be retaliatory if the employer knew of the 
employee's difficulty climbing stairs); cf. Shafer v. Board of 
Public Education, 903 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that, 
when the school board knew that the plaintiff would quit if 
denied paternity leave, the denial constituted a constructive 
discharge). 
 
The district court in granting summary judgment erred in 
treating the transfer from tagger to processor as not an 
adverse employment action. To move DiIenno from work 
she had done satisfactorily for over two years to work she 
was unable to do was an employment action that a 
reasonable jury could find adverse. The facts that her pay 
and benefits were not reduced and that Goodwill considered 
the jobs equivalent are not dispositive. A reasonable jury 
could find that Christine DiIenno's employment was 
substantially worsened. 
 
Goodwill disputes that the transfer was punitive. 
O'Flaherty states that she merely brought more efficient use 
of personnel to the Trexlertown store. The disputed causal 
connection and the credibility of the proferred explanation 
are, of course, issues that a jury must resolve. Torre v. 
Casio, 42 F.3d 825, 831-833 (3d Cir. 1994). DiIenno has 
produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer 
that what motivated Goodwill was retaliatory intent. See 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
As well, the following disputed issues of material fact 
must also be resolved at trial: (1) whether Goodwill 
assigned DiIenno to process in retaliation for her 
harassment complaint or whether management made a 
neutral decision to make everyone a tagger-processor; (2) 
whether Goodwill would have enforced the sorting 
requirement on DiIenno; that is, whether she was 
constructively discharged or whether she jumped the gun 
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by leaving before it was clear that she would be required to 
process. 
 
The order of the district court will be reversed and the 
case remanded for further proceedings. 
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